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Discourse and Decree: Spinoza,
Althusser and Pêcheux
Discours et décret : Spinoza, Althusser et Pêcheux
Warren Montag
1 Althusser called the materialism of the encounter philosophy’s underground current (
courant souterrain), employing the kind of topographical representation of which he was
otherwise  critical,  but  incapable  of  avoiding.  The  topographical  figure  suggests  a
movement or flow beneath the surface of philosophy, a current whose direction may set
it against the movement of philosophy, à contre-courant, but undercover, out of sight.
Such metaphors are probably unavoidable in any attempt to account for the fact that
certain  philosophers  and  philosophies  were  forced  to  live  underground,  to  lead  a
clandestine existence, as if their philosophical survival depended on not being noticed or
read until it was safe to come out into the open. But such topographical schemes can be
misleading. In fact, the philosophers Althusser refers to as belonging to this current (with
the partial exception of Epicurus and Lucretius whose works remained “in custody” for
centuries) were “hiding in plain sight”, as in Poe’s Purloined Letter, concealed in the very
obviousness  of  the meaning attributed to their  works,  as  if,  to  paraphrase Althusser
himself, they were not read in being read, not seen even as they were seen. If we follow
the underground current in its course, we will  arrive at the realization that it is not
underground  at  all,  that  the  opposition  of  surface  and  depth  masks  the  specific
materiality of reading and writing, and even of meaning and non-meaning. Accordingly,
we must apply the materialism of the encounter to its own literal existence, the letters,
words, utterances in which alone this notion exists among other notions, its meanings
rendered legible or illegible by so many lines of force.
2 In certain cases, the mere absence of a word, given that not all absences are equal, may
produce effects in a given utterance or text. The word « ideology », for example, the word
to which Althusser’s name is perhaps more frequently attached than any other, does not
appear a single time in “The Underground Current”. But before we attempt to assign a
meaning to this absence, as if, for example, it represents a rejection of the concept on his
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part,  we  must  first  both  acknowledge  and  confront  the  uneven  and  contradictory
development of Althusser’s notion of ideology. The discontinuous accounts of ideology in
the brief period from “Marxism and Humanism” (1964) to the “Three Notes on a Theory
of Discourses” (1966) and finally “Ideology and the Ideological State Apparatuses” (1970)
might  appear  as  stages  of  development  in  the  progressive  appropriation  of  the
materiality of ideology. According to such a conception, Althusser’s theory of ideology
would be driven by the overcoming of contradictions on the way to the ISAs essay. The
earlier conceptions of ideology are thereby transformed into anticipations, weaker and
less coherent versions, of the later ones. Such a view, however, deprives the attempts to
theorize  ideology  prior  to  the  ISAs  essay  of  the  interest  and  force  proper  to  them,
especially when they conflict with or simply complicate the theses of the 1970 essay. Thus
another absence appears, not in Althusser’s work, but around it, in what has been written
about it : in the twenty years since its posthumous publication, the “Three Notes” has
been  generally  overlooked,  despite  the  fact  that  it  focuses  on  ideology,  the  most
celebrated aspect of Althusser’s work in the Anglophone world.1 In part, this text has
been overlooked because  it  derives  from Althusser’s  attempt  to  develop a  theory  of
discourses as a way of conceptualizing ideology. “Discourse” for most of those who read
Althusser (in the Anglophone world) now has a dated air about it, as if it has outlived its
usefulness  or  was  never  anything other  than a  place-holder  for  other,  more  refined
concepts. But perhaps such a moment, that is, the moment a once ubiquitous concept is
shunned and ignored, is precisely when it becomes possible to think about it in a new
way. 
3 Accordingly, I want to argue, against chronology, that the discussion of discourse and
ideology that  took place between Althusser and a number of  his  colleagues (Balibar,
Macherey, Badiou, Duroux, and, above all, Pêcheux) in the period 1966-67 was not only
not superseded by Althusser’s later text, but in fact offers “solutions” to some of its most
difficult and persistent problems. Thus, the fact that Althusser rather quickly abandoned
this project should not deter – or excuse – us from reading the “Three Notes”. Moreover,
while Althusser moved away from this line of inquiry, Pêcheux (whose name is seldom
seen today in Anglophone studies, even in conjunction with Althusser’s) continued to
develop it in ways that confer considerable interest on the work produced in the course
of that exchange.  As Pierre Macherey has noted,  Pêcheux’s work presents significant
difficulties  to  the  reader  and  not  only  because  it  develops  within  the  element  of
linguistics and must thus confront the contradictions proper to theories of syntax and
semantics which may, especially in the latter case, differ radically from each other in
their assumptions2. A work like Les verités de La Palice (1975) shows the extent to which
Pêcheux was willing to pursue different lines of  inquiry on the hypothesis  that they
would  converge  without  ever  forcing  or  inventing  this  convergence,  even  when  it
remained to be discovered. To read his texts today, however, is to see the extent to which
his work, not despite but because of its theoretical specificity, constitutes an ongoing
dialogue with Althusser which is important for our own time and which begins with the
otherwise overlooked discussion of discourse that took place in 1966-1967. 
4 I want to propose a reading of two texts, Althusser’s “Three Notes” (written in 1966) and
Pêcheux’s “Réflexions sur la situation théorique des sciences sociales et, spécialement, de
la psychologie sociale”, which appeared in Cahiers pour l’analyse (also in 1966, under the
pseudonym Thomas Herbert), to explore the hypothesis that they illuminate a critical but
under-analyzed element that haunts the discussion of ideology that took place around
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Althusser in the sixties.3 The element in question is precisely that of an essential link
between ideology and the unconscious,  not only because of the attributes they share
(transhistoricity, a decentering of the subject, transindividuality, etc.), but because they
are unthinkable except in relation to language,  not insofar as  it  represents a formal
system (or system of systems) but as discourse (the point of indistinction between system
and history which resides precisely in the cracks and fissures that open language to the
outside).  The identification of this link was certainly a consequence of what Pêcheux
called the triple alliance between (Althusserian) Marxism, (Lacanian) psychoanalysis and
linguistics, but the theoretical encounter that produced the texts referred to above could
not have taken place in the absence of a specific reading of Spinoza, the reading that
emerged around Lire “Le Capital” (1965) and Macherey’s Pour une théorie de la production
littéraire (1966). As Althusser announced in the opening of Lire “Le Capital”, it was now
necessary to develop what Spinoza had posed as a problem: the meaning of the simple
and (too) obvious acts “of reading, and in consequence, of writing”. 
5 Spinoza’s importance to the development of a the theory of discourse or discourses was
underscored when Pêcheux, a decade later, in 1977, sought to differentiate his notion of
discourse from that developed in Foucault’s Archaeology of Knowledge. He did so by using
chapters 7-15 of Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus as a contrast medium. “Remontons
de Foucault à Spinoza”, the short text of a presentation Pêcheux gave in Mexico in 1977
and  which  was  only  published  posthumously,  is  less  significant  for  its  critique  of
Foucault’s notion of discourse than for its concise, too concise, excavation of a theory of
discourse in Spinoza’s discussion of scripture and the discursive forms of classical Hebrew
4. Pêcheux’s use of the verb “remonter” is itself notable in that it suggests both a return or
a “going back” and, simultaneously, an ascent, and thus a “going back up” from a lower
elevation to a higher. Pêcheux has thus offered a slightly different version of the famous
theoretical pilgrimages of the time: Lacan’s return to Freud and, of course, Althusser’s
return to Marx. To return to Spinoza, then, is to go back up to the vantage point he
occupies and to see what can only be seen from there. To continue Pêcheux’s journey,
however, may require a slight detour through the Ethics, where the questions of language
and perhaps discourse do not appear to occupy the central place they do in the TTP. I
refer  to  one  of  its  most  provocative  and  productive  moments,  less  obvious  in  its
treatment  of  discourse,  undoubtedly  because  it  concerns  the  very  production  of
obviousness, a moment at which Spinoza explores the act of speaking by proposing what I
will call a theory of the decree (decretum) that compels us to speak certain words arranged
in  certain  phrases,  and  allows us  to  speak  others.  More  importantly,  the  decree
concerning what we cannot say is determined by a forgetting (of words and phrases) that
is itself forgotten and lived by the individual as the freedom to decree for himself what he
does and does not say. The passage in question, the scholium to EIII, P2, never ceased to
inspire and fascinate Althusser.  The essentials of his theory of ideology were derived
from it and so too, in certain ways, were the essentials of attempts by Althusser, Pêcheux
and others in 1966-1967 to develop a theory of discourse.
6  To begin to understand the relevance of one of Spinoza’s most elliptical and difficult
passages to Althusser and Pêcheux, or perhaps simply to understand it at all, we must
identify one of its key interlocutors here: Cicero, in particular, the Cicero of De Finibus
Bonorum  et  Malorum, his  influential  critical  examination of  the  Epicurean  and  Stoic
schools. Epicureanism was for him by far the greater of the two evils for two primary
reasons: its rejection of final causes (and hence the idea of providence) and its insistence
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on tying morality to the pleasures and pains of the body. These concerns alone render
Cicero’s text relevant to Spinoza and the project of the Ethics: it is an eloquent summary
of the very positions Spinoza hopes to demolish. However, like all texts, Cicero’s has its
contradictions: that Cicero tries valiantly to reduce Epicurus’s teaching to an indefensible
caricature of itself in order to refute it does not thereby prevent him, in that very effort,
as he rummages through the philosophical materials at hand in search of material, from
stumbling upon and presenting a discourse whose meaning and value he himself succeeds
in communicating but perhaps cannot grasp.
7 In his attack on the doctrines of the Epicureans in De finibus II, above all, on the notion
that good and evil are nothing more than names of what brings us corporeal pleasure or,
in opposition, corporeal pain, Cicero cites Epicurus’s final letter, supposedly written on
his deathbed to his disciple Hermarchus. In it, Epicurus not only declares that he is near
death, but that he is “suffering from diseases of the bladder and the intestines which are
of the utmost severity”5. If indeed bodily pain is the summum malum, says Cicero, then
Epicurus’s affliction must be complete and unrelieved. But Epicurus denies that this is the
case: his pain, he tells us, is in fact “counterbalanced (compensabatur) by the joy (laetitia)
which I derive from remembering my theories and discoveries”. But the compensation
for the pain and suffering Epicurus describes cannot be “in kind”, according to Cicero, in
that the theories and discoveries he remembers have nothing to do with the pleasures of
the body. It appears then that on his deathbed Epicurus both admits the existence of a
pleasure,  and  thus  a  good,  separate  from  and  independent  of  the  body  and,
simultaneously, denies that bodily pain is the greatest evil. Accordingly, Cicero concludes,
Epicurus departs simultaneously from life, the life of the body, and from his own doctrine
of bodily pleasure as the summum bonum.
8 While Cicero drops the account of Epicurus’s death at this point in his narrative, he will
abruptly return to it a few pages later6, as if he had momentarily forgotten his theme and
suddenly remembers something that had eluded him in his attempt to reveal the telling
discrepancy between Epicurus’s theory and his actual practice. Cicero recalls what the
letter to Hermarchus says, or at least implies, about memory. Has not Epicurus simply
reaffirmed  the  old  adage  that  “the  Wise  Man  will  not  let  past  blessings  fade  from
memory, and it is a duty to forget past misfortunes (bona praeterita non effluere sapienti,
mala meminisse non oportere)?” If so, if according to the testimony contained in his final
letter,  Epicurus  was  able  to  counteract  or  even diminish  present  bodily  pain  of  the
greatest magnitude through the act of will by which he is able to recall his theories and
discoveries, their truth above all, but also the acclaim they produced as their effect, then
he has granted the human individual the power, perhaps the absolute power, absolutum
imperium, to determine what he remembers and what he forgets. But, Cicero asks, is it
indeed “in our power to determine what we remember (in  nostrane potestate  est,  quid
meminerimus)”? Did not Themistocles when given the opportunity to learn the art  of
memory declare that he would “prefer forgetting, for I remember what I don’t want to
remember and cannot forget what I want to forget (Nam memini etiam quae nolo, oblivisci
non possum quae volo)”? It is not possible here to explore the connections between this
section of De finibus and Cicero’s well known advocacy of the ars memoriae in De oratoria;
suffice it to say that his postulation of an art of forgetting in the former text serves to
remind us that the challenge of an art of memory is not simply that of retrieving what has
disappeared into oblivion (or  of  preventing it  from disappearing)  but  of  establishing
order in the face of a surfeit of singular memories, as if the voluntary forgetting of some
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might be necessary to the rational concatenation of others. A problem emerges here that
neither Cicero nor most of his early modern readers would or could acknowledge.
9 If we follow the concatenation of ideas or, more properly, of utterances, that emerges at
this point,  we will  find ourselves in the middle of the Ethics,  where Spinoza offers a
generous supply of arguments that could be used to formulate a refutation of Cicero’s
rather careless critique of Epicurus. From Spinoza’s position, it is possible to see quasi per
nebulam, that is, even in the truncated and travestied form in which they appear in De
finibus,  Epicurean ideas  that  become intelligible  only  retroactively,  as  if  Cicero  were
attempting pre-emptively to close off the path that led from Epicurus to Spinoza. In fact,
Spinoza’s  appropriation  of  Cicero,  of  Cicero’s  Epicurean  argument  against  Epicurus,
constitutes an attempt to develop the off-handed remarks about memory and forgetting
into a theory of the decree, the cause immanent in the distribution of remembrance and
forgetting that is not only prior to individual will but determines an individual’s decisions
or decrees through a forgetting of causes. The scholium to EIII,  P2 (“the body cannot
determine the mind to think, nor can the mind determine the body to motion or rest”)
not  only  explores  some of  the consequences  of  Spinoza’s  argument  that  only  bodies
determine bodies to motion or rest, but it expands the definition of “body”. He recognizes
that the “prejudice” according to which the mind exercises “command” (imperium) over
the body and can determine it to move or refrain from moving, to perform intricate and
complicated tasks and, most important of all, to speak or remain silent is so tenacious in
its obviousness that it is only with great difficulty that he will be able to persuade men
even to question it. He anticipates that while “they” will acknowledge that the mind does
not have command over the circulatory and respiratory systems, to conceive of the body
painting a portrait or building a temple without being determined to do so by the mind
appears impossible. Following Descartes’ examples of the body’s power as a machine that
moves itself, Spinoza must appeal to such phenomena as sleepwalking (alluding to the
“amazing” things somnambulists have accomplished while unconscious) to demonstrate
“what the body can and cannot do without being determined by the mind”. 
10 But of  all  the actions that seem to confirm this prejudice,  none is  as “obvious”,  and
therefore as difficult successfully to call into question as that of speaking, and it is in the
space of this obviousness that Spinoza will take up his position. No action would appear
to have a more intimate, that is, spatially and temporally immediate and unmediated,
relation  with  thought  as  speech.  It  is  an  instantaneous  transcription/  translation  of
thought into a conventional system of sounds and as such suffers less interference from
the body than other actions. Moreover, the mind is present to its words to guarantee
their correspondence to the thoughts they express. What individual could be convinced
to believe that he himself is not the author of his own speech and does not determine the
words he utters? To measure the force of Spinoza’s argument, we might start by noting
the specificity of his terminology in the scholium: when he describes or “spells out” the
specific nature of the mind’s ability to determine the body’s motion or rest in a general
sense, he uses the terms “imperium” (mente quæ imperium in corpus habet), or nutus (corpus
ex solo mentis nutu jam moveri jam quiescere) both of which signify “command”- When he
speaks of the belief that there “is in the mind alone the power to speak or remain silent”,
he employs the term “potestas” (in sola mentis potestate esse tam loqui quam tacere), which
may mean “power” in the sense of legal authority, distinct from physical power, and
which thus interjects, in however muted a form, a pejorative connotation. Finally, and
more strikingly, as he approaches the conclusion of the scholium, Spinoza focuses on the
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belief that the mind through an act of will brings about that movement of respiration,
accompanied by the motions of the lips and tongue,  we call  speech. To describe this
determination of bodily movement by the mind, Spinoza with a single exception uses the
term “decretum” (a decision in the legal sense whose very nature requires that it takes the
form of an utterance grounded in an inequality of both right and force, perhaps better
rendered in English as “decree”), usually in the following phrase: ex libero mentis decreto or
“from a free decree of the mind”. The word decretum occurs 14 times in the scholium and
13 of the 14 occurrences are concentrated in the last 10 sentences – thus more than once
per sentence. What is the effect of this repetition?
11 In part, it allows Spinoza, taking full advantage of the term’s theoretical reversibility, the
fact that even in Latin it is usually reserved for legal judgments or proclamations, to offer
the term to the reader as an instrument of thought. If, according to prejudice, the mind
issues  decrees  to  the body,  experience,  Spinoza suggests,  shows in contrast  that  the
content of these “free” decrees is itself decreed. How can such an idea, so opposed to
what nearly all men believe to be the case, be derived from experience? It is here, near
the conclusion of the scholium, that Spinoza evokes Cicero: there is nothing we can do by
decree of the mind unless we first remember what exactly it is that we hope to decree.
Instead of explaining this rather obscure assertion, Spinoza provides an example that is
indeed drawn from everyday life: “we cannot utter a word unless we remember it”. A
decree,  even the decree we decree to ourselves,  is,  unlike other actions of  the body,
composed of words that do not originate with us and whose meanings (past, present or
future), as Spinoza argues in the TTP, we cannot determine and may in fact not fully
understand. To utter a word is not to create or invent, but rather to enter a world that
resembles a rain of atoms through the void more than a system, in which linkages of
words are formed, persist and then shatter, depriving words, texts and, as the case of
Hebrew suggests, entire languages of meaning, rendering them marks on a page or mere
sounds without sense. But even our access to a given supply of words is determined by
causes beyond our knowledge or control:  “it is not in the free power of the mind to
remember or to forget anything”. What “comes to mind” is itself decreed, the effect of a
decree addressed to a community of speakers, of believers, but one by one, individually,
from within, so that each shall receive it separately. 
12 In these lines, both the act of remembering and the act of forgetting are deprived of their
“subjective” character and the problem that Spinoza identifies, quite separate from that
of the mind’s ability to move the body, is that of the utterable and the unutterable, and
accordingly the thinkable and the unthinkable. The extension of ritual into every aspect
of life that Spinoza attributes to the Hebrew state in the TTP applies above all to speech,
except that the Hebrew people were commanded to remember that the decrees they daily
observed were decreed by God, and not by a man, not even Moses, from whom decrees
would literally constitute idolatry. Their awareness of both the commandments and the
source made their obedience a conscious act even if, as Spinoza hints, by obeying God
they  in  fact  obeyed  themselves.  In  the  case  of  the  decreta to  which  Spinoza  refers,
obedience to the decree concerning what can and cannot be said, is secured through a
forgetting of the decree which is lived as the individual’s free decision. And the concept of
ritual is particularly important here in that its power is not simply negative, the set of
prohibitions that become habit or custom. There are words and sequences of words that
cannot be forgotten or cannot not be remembered. They are the utterances we cannot not
produce, and moreover do not desire not to produce. What we assume is our own decree,
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a decree we have decreed to ourselves to decree, is in fact the decree to which we are
subject concerning what must, can and cannot be said. The subject, then, in the modern
sense, emerges only through the forgetting and denial of the subjection which, addressed
to him, calls him into existence. The free decree of the mind is thus an act of submission
to the liturgy of the body that is the foundation of human servitude: “the mind’s decrees
are nothing other than the appetites themselves and for this reason vary according to the
disposition of the body” (mentis decreta nihil sint præter ipsos appetitus, quæ propterea varia
sunt pro varia corporis dispositione). From this follows the irreducible contradiction at the
heart of the figure of the somnambulist who stalks the pages of the Ethics: he is both the
slave who dreams he has freely decreed his own servitude and the individual who, by
breaking free from the prescribed dispositions of the body, the actions it is directed to
perform  and  the  words  it  is  constrained  to  pronounce,  can  forget  the  decree  of
subjection. How does such a breaking free occur? As Pêcheux argues, every ritual insofar
as it must be performed or re-enacted remains haunted by the possibility of “infelicities”,
the missteps, misstatements, slips and stumblings, the deviations from the wording of the
decree that not only make it visible in the response they provoke, but like the swerve of
the atom for Lucretius, become the cause of something new: il n’y a cause que de ce qui
cloche. And when the deviations from ritual conjoin in their movement, a world is born:
the world of resistance.
13 Even this  brief  account of  Spinoza’s  attempt to dismantle the prejudice according to
which the mind is (or could or should) be master of the body, will suffice to show the way
in which Althusser took on both the problems posed explicitly in the text and those
arising from its elisions and silences, the points at which its arguments were suspended
and abandoned even as the words continued. Althusser’s attempts to think with Spinoza
can most clearly be seen in the “Three Notes”, as well as the ISAs essay (and thus the
entire section of Sur la reproduction entitled “On Ideology”).  Moreover, it  is clear that
“Three Notes”, written as his contribution to a discussion on the concept of discourse,
served  as  a  kind  of  experiment,  one  result  of  which  was  the  idea  of  ideological
interpellation, the “central thesis” of the ISAs text. The same cannot be said of the term
discourse itself, which appears only 12 times in the later text. Of these, one passage in
particular will help us “remonter” both to Spinoza and to Althusser’s own “Three Notes”:
I shall therefore say that, where only a single subject (such and such an individual)
is concerned, the existence of the ideas of his belief is material in that his ideas are
his material actions inserted into material practices governed by material rituals
which are themselves defined by the material  ideological  apparatus from which
derive the ideas of  that  subject. Naturally,  the four inscriptions of  the adjective
‘material’  in  my  proposition  must  be  affected  by  different  modalities:  the
materialities of a displacement for going to mass, of kneeling down, of the gesture
of the sign of the cross, or of the mea culpa, of a sentence, of a prayer, of an act of
contrition,  of  a  penitence,  of  a  gaze,  of  a  hand-shake,  of  an  external  verbal
discourse  or  an ‘internal’  verbal  discourse  (consciousness),  are  not  one and the
same materiality. I shall leave on one side the problem of a theory of the differences
between the modalities of materiality7.
14 The theoretical  proximity of  this  passage to  EIII,  P2,  scholium is  striking indeed.  Its
guiding assumption is  that “the mind’s decrees are nothing other than the appetites
themselves and for this reason vary according to the disposition of the body” and that the
disposition of the body is determined by rituals of which the Catholic Mass is but the most
obvious example. There is nothing of the spirit to be found in this scene. Even the faith of
the individual believer is material in that his “ideas are his material actions” themselves
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“inserted into material  practices  governed by material  rituals”.  It  is  in  invoking the
different  “modalities” of  materiality that  Althusser is  led by the sequence of  actions
required by participation in the Mass to refer to discourse. The belief of the believer, his
faith or fidelity, exists in the bodily movements of going to Mass, kneeling, making the
sign of the cross, beating his breast three times at the precise moment he utters the
words “mea culpa, mea culpa, mea maxima culpa”. Here, the modality is that of an external
verbal discourse, in this case, a very specific discourse whose words and their sequence
are prescribed and which occupies a position among other material actions in a ritual
that requires that each individual recite it. 
15 What Althusser calls external verbal discourse, however, is followed in his list by what he
calls  “‘internal’  [in  quotation  marks]  verbal  discourse  (consciousness)”.  His  use  of
punctuation, by now familiar to his readers, serves as a kind of shorthand. The term
“internal”,  unlike “external” in the previous phrase, which Althusser does not put in
quotation marks, is thus not to be taken literally, in its spatial sense, as if the human
world  were  divisible  into  inner  and  outer,  subjective  and  objective.  Althusser’s
punctuation  merely  emphasizes  what  the  repetition  of  “verbal  discourse”  already
suggests: that what is taken for the inner is in fact a continuation of the outside, as if he
had borrowed Lacan’s assertion that in following the silent discourse of thought, one will
come back to the surface that is supposed to be its other side8. Althusser’s reference to
“consciousness” (a word he will declare “disappeared” less than a page later), enclosed as
it is in parentheses, compels us to translate it just as we translated “internal” into the
language  of  pure  exteriority.  Henceforth,  “consciousness”  can  be  understood  as  the
continuation of an external surface that has no inside or underside. Thus, in the idea of
reflexivity contained in Locke’s notion of consciousness as a doubling that permits the
“perception of what passes in a man’s own mind”9, the adjective “own” essentially marks
the mind as an internal space irreducibly separate from all such other internal spaces and
the perception of what passes in it, that is, consciousness, pertains to that mind, that self,
and that person and no other. The notion of discourse, social and transindividual by its
very nature, excludes the idea of an interior, of thought, belief and faith as the products
of an autonomous mind’s “own” activity, the legal person whose separation from others
serves to guarantee his freedom – the very prejudice Spinoza denounced. Discourse, then,
against consciousness, against interiority, against the forms of ideality. The problem may
now be posed: how are individuals constituted as subjects and what is the function of
discourse in this process?
16 The fact that the theory that Althusser proposes in the “Three Notes on a Theory of the
Discourses” is not a theory of discourse in the singular, but a theory of “discourses”, is
significant.  While  he  refers  to  four  discourses,  the  discourse  of  the  unconscious,
ideological  discourse,  aesthetic  discourse and scientific  discourse,  nothing in his  text
suggests that these are the only, possible or actual, discourses (in the manner of Lacan’s
four discourses in L’envers de la psychanalyse). But there remains a problem : what permits
us to speak of a discourse of science and a discourse of the unconscious together, as
Althusser does, as if they were modes of a single substance ? The answer, of course, lies in
what is common to both and, more, the very element in which they exist : language (by
which I mean what is understood as the French “langue”). In fact, at a certain point in the
text, when he speaks of the “structure of these different discourses”, and the “nature of
the specific signifiers that make up the elements of each of these structures”, the first
discourse in a list of five, rather than the four thus far mentioned, is none other than “
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langue” : “The signifiers of language or morphemes (matter : phonemes)”10. In one sense,
the  term  langue generally  denotes  the  system,  the  system  of  three  systems  (the
phonological,  the  morphological  and the  syntactical)  that  furnish the  foundation (or
base) for the particular langues. Thus, while scientific discourse could certainly exist in
the absence of aesthetic discourse and vice versa, no discourse, insofar as it is expressed
in a langue, could exist except on the basis of langue (understood as the system of the
systems necessarily mobilized in the enunciation of even the simplest utterance) that
“generates” it. How can the origin of discourse as such be itself another discourse, one
among many, without endangering the very explanatory scheme that assigns langue its
priority ? 
17 This problem occurs to Althusser, but only as an afterthought written in the margins of
the manuscript : “The function of language is not at the same level =since there is no
function of language ! But only of the discourse for which it provides either constitutive
(first-storey)  elements  (segments)  of  signifiers”11.  Here  he  appears  to  endorse  the
topographical representation of langue, langues, and discourse as a hierarchy of levels (
plans) such that langue furnishes the elements to, but must remain outside of, discourse in
relation to which it has no (explanatory) function. This model is in certain key respects
similar to that of base and superstructure, including the need (which also arises as an
afterthought) to defend the “relative” autonomy of the “upper floors” of the structure.
But Althusser’s dissatisfaction with such models and more importantly with the notion of
emanative  causality  they  incarnate,  leads  him back towards  the  idea  of  a  structural
causality and the concept of the immanent or absent cause he had begun to develop in
Lire le Capital.  His addendum concludes with a surprisingly general assertion, but one
which allows us to make sense of his notion that langue is a discourse : “Thus there are no
functions of language in this sense for language does not exist : only discourses exist”12.
This note captures in a clear and succinct manner the movement or movements proper to
Althusser’s thought, the struggle to evade capture by the dominant forces in philosophy,
the  sense  of  the  ever-present  traps  and  snares  laid  for  the  unwary,  the  ruses  and
diversions that more often than not are successful, but which his heightened awareness
and  acceptance  of  the  need  to  think  through  the  struggle  allow  him,  in  certain
spectacular instances, to evade. And in this war, a war of resistance, survival, the survival
of a line of thought, is victory enough. The conclusion of the addendum not only does not
follow from the topographical explanation that precedes it, but nullifies that explanation.
There can be no topography in which langue would occupy the ground floor, because “
langue does not exist”. Further, because it does not exist, the idea of discourse in general,
of a discourse of discourses, disappears. If langue, however, is not present “in person”, it is
because  it  has  disappeared  into  its  effects,  dispersed  not  in  discourse,  but  in  the
irreducible plurality of discourses. It has become, as Pêcheux and Gadet put it more than
a decade later, “la langue introuvable”13. Linguistics, whose object is precisely langue in the
singular and in person, is,  according to Althusser, “incapable by itself of producing a
theory of the different discourses,  and this inability is masked by the claim that it can
produce this theory on the pretext that it can furnish a theory of discourse – but no theory
of  discourse can  stand in  for,  replace  or  deduce  from itself  a  theory  of  discourses”14.
Moreover, the inability to think not the unity of discourse but its diversity is tied to the
existence of langue as a discourse. Langue may be thought of as a discourse in a double
sense : because it is the cause that cannot exist outside of its effects, here, discourses, but
also because langue, scattered among the discourses, themselves embedded in the
material existence of ideologies which are subject to the aleatory and plural temporality
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of  history,15 can never  be  simply a  rule-governed system whose expansion follows a
juridical model of consistency based on a sequence of precedents (even if it is grounded in
neurobiology). As Pêcheux and Gadet would argue later, in a sense completing or at least
extending Althusser’s analyses, whether this system is understood as an “order proper to
langue, immanent in the structure of its effects” (the tradition that extends from Port
Royal to Hjemslev and Chomsky), or as an order deriving from the accretion of decisions
and therefore imposed from the outside (sociolinguistics), an artificial construction that
serves the broader political order, that is, whether the foundation of the model is rational
or empirical, it can exist only through a systematic repression of what Gadet and Pêcheux
will later call, following Jean-Claude Milner16, the “real of langue” : the fissures (failles),
gaps, and contradictions that set this order against itself in a perpetual production of
equivocity. There exists “in every langue a segment” that can be “both itself and at the
same time other through the homophony, homosemy, metaphor, glissement of the lapsus
and word play, and the double meanings (double entente) of its discursive effects”17. Thus,
the process of the production of discursive effects is simultaneously and necessarily a
production of side-effects. It is this fact that makes the historical existence of discourses
something other than the actualization of already existing logical possibilities, that is, to
use the familiar phrase, a process without a subject or end(s). 
18 Pêcheux’s reflections on langue and on discourse as cited here may, I would argue, be
regarded as the deferred effect not simply of Althusser’s “Three Notes” but of the entire
discussion whose imprint it bears. He reminds us of the centrality of psychoanalysis and
its fundamental concept, the unconscious, to this discussion, even if Althusser’s ultimate
objective is the development of a theory of ideology. It was precisely Althusser’s attempt
to displace the concept of consciousness from the position at the center of every attempt
to develop a theory of ideology that compelled him to turn to the field in which this
struggle  was  being  most  intransigently  waged :  Lacan’s  work  on psychoanalysis.  The
rejection of all notions of interiority, and above all, any identification of the ego with
consciousness, will or subjectivity, was made possible through Lacan’s “linguistic turn”
which  allowed  him  to  abandon  these  notions  in  favor  of  a  logic  of  the  signifier.
Henceforth, the unconscious appeared as little more than an archaic term preserved as a
monument to the heroic age of  psychoanalysis,  the theoretical  equivalent of  Charing
Cross in Freud’s anecdote, a cross erected by the order of Edward I in memory of his chère
reine, but whose memorial purpose, long forgotten, remains unknown to contemporary
Londoners. Althusser, however, argued that the history of psychoanalysis was marked by
the persistent  return of  a  philosophy of  consciousness that  translates psychoanalytic
concepts into the idiom of the subject of needs or of alienation, as if the cure were a
process of restoring an individual’s own self through recollection, the exercise of the will
(the ego) in an alliance with the analyst that strengthens its resolve to appropriate the
socially proscribed “instincts” in the one case and its alienated self in the other. While
Lacan’s declaration that the unconscious is the discourse of the Other works in one sense
to exclude the very possibility of an inner/outer distinction and thus any recourse to a
consciousness prior to discourse, the fact that the discourse is attributed to the Other,
cannot fail  to suggest that this Other functions like a subject who is  both cause and
proprietor of this discourse. Lacan’s use of the “subject of the unconscious”, even if it is
not referred to the Other, seemed to Althusser to constitute a return of the repressed in
its very denial. 
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19 The question of the subject is at the center of the “Three Notes”, a center not only in
conflict  with itself  but,  in its  very division,  moving in different directions.  Althusser
begins by defining discourse in part as the arrangement of signifiers according to the
rules or laws proper to each of the four discourses (unconscious, aesthetic, scientific and
ideological).  But  what  really  marks  a  discourse  as  discourse  and allows  Althusser  to
produce a theory of their difference is that each in its own manner produces the subject
proper to it. The subject proper to the discourse of science is an absent subject, a subject
that  has  always  just  disappeared.  Indeed,  the  absence  of  the  subject  is  what  alone
distinguishes it from ideology, into which it would lapse if the subject were present on
the scene. The subject of aesthetic discourse always appears in the form of “interposed
persons” (always in the plural). The discourse of the unconscious differs from the others
in that the signifier that functions as a subject is always a “stand-in” or “lieu-tenant” for a
subject  never  present  in  person  but  represented  by  its  emissaries.  Only  ideological
discourse produces a subject form that requires its individual Träger to be present in
person. By the end of the “Three Notes”, Althusser will reject the account of the subject
proper to each of the four discourses, to argue that it exists only in ideological discourse:
since writing the first note, he tells us, “I have come round to thinking that the notion of
subject cannot be employed unequivocally not even as an index of each of the discourses.
Increasingly, the notion of subject seems to me to pertain to ideological discourse alone, of
which it is constitutive. I don’t believe that one can talk about a “subject of science” or a
“subject of the unconscious” without playing on words and opening the door to serious
theoretical ambiguities”18. 
20 The effect of this conclusion is to allow Althusser to comprehend the subject form of
ideology not as the pre-existing position proper to each discourse, open to be filled, as in
the quasi-formalist scheme of the four discourses he had earlier sketched out, but as a
process of subjection/subjectivation and therefore a site of struggle and contestation.
Deviating  from  his  own  version  of  the  linguistic  model,  Althusser  proposes  a  new
concept : interpellation. “Ideology interpellates the individual by constituting him as a
subject (an ideological subject and therefore the subject of its discourse)”. There remains
much to say about the verb “interpellate”, its meaning and function both in general and
within Althusser’s text. Here, I will only refer to its most immediately relevant meanings
and  associations.  In  Latin  and  in  French  legal  and  political  language,  “interpellate”
denotes an act (typically an interruption, unexpected and usually unwelcome) by which
the interpellated person is  separated from a group and “called upon to answer” for
himself  and  his  actions.  Interpellation  is  also  understood  today  as  a  version  of  the
rhetorical device of apostrophe, in which a speaker directly addresses an absent person
or personification as if it were present (as in “my Lord, my Lord, why have you forsaken
me ?”).19 In the “Three Notes”, ideology, or more properly ideological discourse, separates
every individual from every other individual and in one and the same movement calls
upon the individual  to answer for himself,  furnishing in the process the “raisons” or
arguments which, once articulated, confirm the individual’s status as subject and agent.
The subject thus called upon is strictly speaking absent until the call renders him present.
In this sense, ideological discourse interpellates the individual by “imputing” agency to
him and designating him as the uncaused cause of his speech and actions for which he
thus  bears  sole  responsibility:  these  are  precisely  the  defining  characteristics  of  the
subject. But this discourse simultaneously supplies him with the “raisons-de-sujet”, the
signifiers  and  utterances  whose  very  materiality  allows  them  produce  the  effect  of
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subjectivity, the folding of discourse back upon itself to produce an “inside” that is in fact
a continuation/extension of the outside. 
21 But we cannot fail to note the resistances that prevent Althusser from confronting and
overcoming  the  hesitations  and  inconsistencies  in  his  argument  and  therefore  from
developing his theory of discourses. I have discussed elsewhere the moment, near the end
of his text, at which Althusser, as if attempt to negate or diminish what he has written,
retreats from the notion of the materiality of discourses by declaring that discourses are
not  practices.20 Practices  produce  effects  that  transform  the  real,  while  discourses
produce such effects only insofar as these effects pass through a practice or practices,
which thus mediate between discourse and reality, the sole means of contact between
them.  But  this  is  not the  only  point  at  which  Althusser  draws  back  from the  very
conclusions to which his arguments lead. 
22 Ideology doesn’t simply interpellate individuals as subjects, authors of, and responsible
for, their works. It also, he tells us, “recruits” and “requisitions” them as Träger, and thus
as supports for the economic base of every social formation. Althusser’s repeated use of
these terms as synonyms highlights the contradiction at work here. Both are military
terms (although “requisition” has a more limited lexical range than “recruit”) denoting
the act by which the military replenishes its ranks or increases the number of soldiers.
When Althusser  argues  that  the  economic  base  of  every  social  formation “requires”
individuals to fill  the positions necessary to its functioning, he uses the related term
“requisition”. The verb “requisition” in French as in English signifies a command that as
such  neither  seeks  the  consent  of  the  individual  whose  property  or  person  is
appropriated nor tolerates any refusal : all are required to heed the order when they are
“called  up”.  While  the  means  of  appropriation  may  vary,  the idea  of  requisitioning
assumes the resistance of the proprietor to the loss of property and thus carries with it
the ever-present threat of force. In contrast, the ideology which arises from this base
precisely  in  order  to  assure  its  persistence  (Althusser  writes  here  in  a  functionalist
“shorthand” that too easily replaces the theory for which it was meant to serve as a
temporary stand-in) “recruits” the individuals with which it will fulfill the requisition
order that emanates from the base. “Recruit” typically presupposes the consent of the
individual who is convinced to “enlist”, “sign up for” or join the army, a company, an
organization, etc. Indeed, he tells us, perhaps in response to Pêcheux’s idea of the social
command,  which  we  will  examine  in  a  moment,  “ideology  is  not  a  command/
commandment” nor an “injunction pure and simple” realized in “pure force (there is no
such thing as pure force)”21. If ideology interpellates individuals by constituting them as
subjects  to  meet  the  demand  of  the  economic  base,  the  subjects  it  constitutes  are
provided with a guarantee that they are indeed subjects (agents and authors separated
from every other agent and author),  proprietors of their speech and action and thus
responsible for their consequences: their identity. They are thus addressed as identical to
themselves and no other, and as such become identifiable. Althusser added the following
allegory in the margins of the text: when the police stop (interpellate) an individual in
the street for questioning, their first order is inevitably that the individual in question
produce proof of his identity, proof whose sole legitimate form is the “identification” that
they themselves furnished him with.22 
23 But this guarantee has an internal as well as external function : by verifying the identity
of  the  interpellated  subject,  it  both  requires  and  permits  the  individual  subject  to
“recognize” himself as subject, that is, not simply to be, act and feel like a subject but to
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know that he does so and to know that he knows ; this is precisely Locke’s definition of
consciousness.  The  very  act  of  recognizing  (re-cognizing,  re-knowing,  remembering)
oneself requires more than simply an external guarantee of identity : Althusser asserts
that the subject must duplicate itself in the form of an omnipotent and omniscient other
who knows what he cannot know about himself, including all that he has forgotten, and
to whom he is accountable. It is to this internal tribunal that ideology must present its
case : in order to win, ideology must use “persuasion” to “convince/convict” the subject
to comply with the requirements of the economic base. Althusser has thus forgotten the
task of conceptualizing the materiality of the discourses which alone will allow him to
escape  the  trap  of  subjective  interiority.  If  this  were  the  conclusion  of  his  inquiry,
Althusser would have paradoxically produced a theory of the interpellated subject whose
interpellation confers upon him the freedom to refuse the demand of the economic base –
if  he  does  not  find its  arguments  “persuasive”  –  and therefore the power to  decree
whether or not he (his body) will be at the disposal of the economic base that requires it.
Fortunately this is not the case: Althusser is drawn out of this impasse by the power of the
concept of the unconscious as Lacan has explained it, above all in the Four Fundamental
Concepts.  It  is  the notion of  the discourse of  the unconscious,  not  the subject  of  the
unconscious, but precisely the gap or hole that interpellation “induces” (as if it induced
amnesia) in the very subject it calls into being. We should not forget that “imputation”,
the legal  attribution of  free will  and personality to a body whose words and actions
remain so opaque that the very existence of legal responsibility depends on individuals
being treated “as if” they were free and therefore responsible for “their own” actions,
possesses a double materiality: the stubborn resistance of the body to interpretation on
the one hand and on the other the rather cynical materiality of a discourse without a
referent, a discourse that does not represent the internal state of the accused individual
but compensates for its irreducible lack by supplying in prosthetic form the attribution
that the law demands. The faculty of consciousness, the perception of perception and the
thought  about  thought,  the  guarantee  that  what  we  think  is  what  we  really  think,
emerged out of the concept of “conscience” which already implied not simply a moral
faculty, but an ability unique to the individual to “supervise” (super-videre or oversee) not
merely actions, but thoughts and passions. It is possible to salvage from Althusser’s initial
but soon rejected discussion of the subject forms proper to each of the four discourses,
the idea that interpellation as he understands it is the combined effect of the discourse of
ideology and the discourse of the unconscious: “the interpellation of human individuals
as ideological subjects produces in them a specific effect,  the unconscious effect that
permits  human  individuals  to  assume  the  function  of  ideological  subjects”23.  If  we
suppress the functionalist afterthought here (which Althusser will deny is functionalist a
page later) and refrain from assigning the unconscious a role in the production of the
imputed/interpellated subject, we might say that the unconscious is a necessary effect of
the discursivity realized in the act of interpellation, of the discursive materiality that is
only one of the modes of matter mobilized in this complex operation. Far from arising to
fulfill a social need, the unconscious induced by interpellation is the reproduction of the
impossible proper to “the subject of discourse”, the impossibility of its coinciding with
itself, of its being present to itself to be known by an act of con-scientia, the thinking about
what  it  thinks  and  feels.  Thus,  interpellation  postulates  a  subject  whose  ability  to
appropriate  himself  is  guaranteed  by  the  accompanying  postulation  of  an  absolute
Subject,  the  Subject  of  all  knowledge  who,  because  he  forgets  nothing,  demands  an
accounting for everything. At the same time and in the same gesture, the discursive acts
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by  which  it  is  accomplished  produce  as  a  side-effect  an  “abîme”  or  hole  where  the
conscious subject should discover itself but cannot, as if interpellation adds subjectivity
to the body but only at the cost of a subtraction that deprives this subjectivity of what is
its own. 
24 Pêcheux’s essay, which appeared six months before Althusser began to write the “Three
Notes”, perhaps, as I have suggested, in part as a response to Pêcheux’s text, suggests a
way out of some of the impasses that Althusser encounters in the “Three Notes”. He does
so not by abandoning the concept of discourse, as Althusser does in the ISAs essay, to
avoid the problems it engendered in the “Three Notes”, but precisely by establishing the
materiality proper to it, a materiality that the very concept of language (in the broad
sense)  works  to  deny.  Pêcheux’s  starting  point  is  identical  to  Althusser’s :  the
reproduction of a social formation (although he will insist, almost from the moment the
ISAs essay appeared in La Pensée, on the formulation “reproduction/transformation” as a
preventative measure against  functionalism).  Unlike Althusser,  however,  even in this
early text,  Pêcheux is not only unwilling to use functionalist  arguments as a kind of
shorthand or place-holder faute de mieux, but refuses to rank functionalism as a secondary
enemy with whom one can safely conclude tactical alliances. His sense of the threat of
functionalism, especially in the theoretical conjuncture of the pre-1968 period, not only
leads him to rectify some of Althusser’s formulations, but also pushes him to theorize the
disorder specific to langue and to discourse (in the face of the nearly irresistible force of
the formalism of emerging linguistic theories) from the earliest moments of his career.
Ideology, he tells us early on in the essay, is not produced by the final cause of social
reproduction,  but  first  appears  as  a  “sous-produit”  (or  by-product)  of  what  he  calls
“technical practice”, a practice that applies “instruments and the forms of human labor
implied by them” on a given “raw material” to obtain certain products.24 This practice
exhibits what Pêcheux calls  “an external  teleological  structure” :  it  seeks “to fulfill  a
need, a lack, a demand” that comes from without. The “law of the technical response to a
social demand is constitutive of technical practice”25. But we should not be misled by the
term  “constitutive”;  because  technical  ideology  “belongs  to  the  same  process”  as
technical practice and is therefore coextensive with it, the very means by which technical
practice “responds” to social  demand opens the ever-present possibility that  the by-
product may overpower the product, the side-effect neutralize the intended effect, and a
given response to social demand may represent a kind of interference that represses or
displaces another response. 
25 Even when Pêcheux moves  to  political  practice  and its  relation  to  a  given mode  of
production, he carefully avoids the notion that an economic base produces the means of
its own reproduction, as if it were a deliberating (collective) subject acting with an end in
view. Instead, he refers to the “immanent cause”26 that makes intelligible the conflictual
or even ruptural unity of unequal forces that constitutes every mode of production and
submits  it  not  to  the  law of  an  internal  teleology,  but  to  an  aleatory  movement  of
encounter and struggle.  Political  practice works on “social relations”,  but  does so in
response to the “social demand” that “emanates” from them. “Demand”, however much
the social sciences work to deny it, is first of all a word and as such belongs to a discursive
field that determines its possible synonyms, and thus its meaning. Even in this early text,
Pêcheux treats meaning as a matter of (re)formulation and paraphrase based on a finite
chain  of  possible  substitutions.  Here,  he  will  propose  a  synonym  for  demand  that,
running the very real risk of remaining illegible, plays on the visibility of a shared root
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(the Latin mando) to expose the ideological determination of what can and cannot be
substituted for “demand”. Thus, political practice seeks to “transform social relations by
reformulating social demand (demand and also command in the double sense in which it
is to be understood form, this point on) by means of a discourse. In saying this, we do not
claim that politics is reducible to discourse, but that every decision, every « measure » in
the political sense takes its place in political practice like a sentence in a discourse”27.
This is a dense and elliptical passage that suggests a number of lines of inquiry, some of
which  directly  link  Pêcheux’s  analysis  to  Spinoza’s  use  of  the  term “decree”  in  the
scholium to EIII, P2, and that proposes ideas and concepts whose development Pêcheux
defers to other texts, above all, Les vérités de La Palice. His critical intervention here, which
constitutes a turning point in the discussion of discourse, is his insistence that every
political decision, every measure taken, including the extreme measures that war and
revolution require, that is, even the use of force itself, must always also, in order to be
effective, take the form of a sentence (une phrase) linked to other sentences in a discourse.
Every  political  “decision”  (Spinoza’s  decretum)  exists  in  a  material  form  that  is
simultaneously physical and discursive, without the one modality being reducible to or
caused by the other: both are determined in their consubstantial unity by an immanent
causality. 
26  But the passage also poses a problem: how do we account for the “reformulation” that,
without explanation, leads from “demand” to “command” treating the two words, at least
in the context implied by “social demand”, as synonyms? In English, both are specimens
of illocution that indicate not simply the speaker’s desire that the addressee preform a
certain action,  but a sense that  the speaker has the power to compel  this  action.  In
French,  however,  the  “ordinary”  sense  of  the  term,  “demande”,  is  to  request  or  ask
something of  someone endowed with the ability  to  supply  what  is  requested (a  job,
someone’s hand in marriage, etc.) In both languages, however, demand also functions as a
quasi-technical term that might well  appear to be nothing more than a homonym of
“demand” in either English or French: as in the law of supply and demand (la loi de l’offre
et  de  la  demande).  But  Pêcheux’s  linking of  the two terms produces  other  effects:  he
reminds us that demand in this sense is not a question, request or even, as in English, an
order, or an expression of necessity. It is neither an illocutionary act nor even a speech
act: when manufacturers are described as “responding” to market signals indicating a
rise or fall in demand, their response is, from a statistical perspective, automatic and
instantaneous, as if “demand” were synonymous with “stimulus”; the “subjective factor”,
to  the  extent  it  is  anything  other  than  the  transparency  of  demand  to  itself,  is
epiphenomenal,  nothing  more  than  an  insignificant  bit  of  static  in  the  flow  of
information. In fact, it is commonly said that “the market responds” to demand, rather
than consumers or manufacturers, who, except in unusual circumstances, serve solely as
the Träger of the market’s order. This order is conceived as natural and invariant, and
what  is  more,  a  perfect  coincidence of  what  is  and what  should be.  If  a  psychology
emerges  from this  scheme,  it  is  certainly  not  deduced  from individuals  or  a  group.
Instead, it is a psychology “imputed” to individuals or groups after the fact, descending
from the market as totality to the hypothetical (or methodologically derived) individuals
that are its functions. 
27 We may now see why Pêcheux would link demand in this sense to command : not only do
both terms have their origins in the Latin verb, mando (meaning to order someone to do
something), but their common historical root is visible in the graphic materiality of the
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words  themselves.  This  fact  is  a  symptom,  a  trace  of  the  work  of  “reformulation/
paraphrase” that has enforced a separation between these terms that is critical, perhaps
necessary, to the existence of what we now call neo-liberalism which must deny its own
existence as a “command economy”, a phrase used exclusively to denote those other,
“unfree” social and economic systems. To paraphrase social demand as social command
(perhaps at the risk of intelligibility) is to show that meanings are imposed by a necessity
that is simultaneously internal and external to discourse. Typically, as Pêcheux explained
in a later text, the utterances produced by the speaking subject are “displacements within
the  interior  of  the  formulable”  determined  by  a  given  discursive  formation  itself
determined by an outside that, because it determines it, “remains strictly unformulable”28
. The unformulable outside is nevertheless present in discourse as the barrier that limits
what can be said and thought and by that fact renders itself unthinkable. By what he does
as much as by what he says, Pêcheux shows that if it is possible to speak of illusion here, it
is  not  located  in  consciousness  or  subjectivity,  prior  to  the  use  of  language,  but  in
discourse itself, in the relations between its elements, words and phrases, particularly the
relations of  substitutability which are normally imposed on individuals without their
knowledge or consent. 
28 How  then  can  a  “reformulation/paraphrase”  escape  the  meanings  imposed  by  the
discursive formation in which a word or utterance is produced ? The answer, of course,
lies in the fact that discursive formations are themselves sites of struggle, struggles over
meaning, as well as against subjection. Discourse, as fortune as theorized by Machiavelli,
brings  the good with the bad and in its  variability presents  certain openings for  an
intervention that may overturn an existing discursive regime. If “the meaning of a word,
proposition, does not exist in itself” but is constituted by discourse, that is, what Pêcheux
would  later  call  a  discursive  formation,  through  “the  relations  of  substitution,
paraphrase, synonymies, etc.,  which are operative between linguistic elements”29,  it is
precisely in this dislocation that the ideological outside is present within discourse, the
effect  of  the equilibrium of  forces in the great struggles that both envelope and are
enveloped by discourse.  In this way, discursive relations and discursive processes are
subject to alternating periods of stability in which relations between elements are held in
place and to periods of instability which permit new formulations and thus new meanings
to emerge. Even in the latter case, however, political practice may reformulate “social
demand” to give it a simultaneously discursive and ideological existence in a way that is
clearly apologetic: social demand is not simply a demand for what is socially “necessary”
(the meaning of  which is  one of  the most  important  stakes  of  class  struggle),  but  a
demand for  what  should be,  for  what  is  both rational  and right.  But  Pêcheux’s  own
analysis is itself a “reformulating” of (social) demand made possible by an opening that
not only allowed him to give it a new meaning but in doing so make legible and audible
the command whose mandate demand executes. 
29 To read the discursive form, the words and phrases which give demand its discursive
reality, is for Pêcheux to reformulate it as command, thereby inscribing it in a scene of
discipline and punishment : one cannot ignore a command without impunity. Freud once
remarked that his obsessional patients did not know the wording of their own obsessional
ideas ; in a similar sense, those who obey the social command do not know its precise
wording, that is, what exactly they are commanded to do, even as they do it, nor does the
command present itself as an act of both illocutionary and physical force : it is expressed
in such phrases as “everyone knows that…” or “as anyone can see”. The discursive act of
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making  visible  the  discursive  existence  of  a  quasi-natural  social  demand  as
simultaneously  social  command,  and  therefore  a  decision,  a  decretum, is  no  more
restricted in its effects to discourse than the command itself, which can be produced only
in an institutional context of unequal forces. To formulate the command as command, to
translate it into itself, is to disobey one of its most important orders : it is thus both the
cause and effect of a shift in power relations. 
30 To show what is at stake in the reformulation of demand as command, Pêcheux points to
historical experience: the political practice of revolutionary organizations, even when
they  were  part  of  a  broad  mass  movement,  has  failed  to  achieve  their  goal  of
transforming their societies and they have instead resorted to measures that,  despite
both intention and appearance, have preserved inequality and exploitation under the
cover  of  change.  They have taken for  nature and natural  necessity  what  are  in fact
decisions  expressed  in  the  form  of  commands.  How  has  this  happened?  They  have
“forgotten” the (existence of the) command, the content of which they live as nature or
reason (“everybody knows that…”), and whose form and force they are commanded by
the wording of the command itself to attribute to a decree that originates in their agency.
31 Pêcheux described his work as defined by the “linking of the question of the constitution
of meaning to that of the subject”, a linkage “located inside the central thesis itself in the
figure  of  interpellation”30.  Citing Althusser,  Pêcheux notes  that  both the  question of
meaning and the question of the subject are constructed as “obvious” (évidentes), that is,
immediately visible and standing before us, “in the way” (Latin: ob-via), unavoidable: 1)
every  word  has  a  meaning,  a  notion  based  on  the  equally  obvious  fact  of  the
“transparency of  language”31 and 2)  all  of  us,  you who are like me,  are free,  ethical
subjects. Thus, it is necessary to account for the effect of the obviousness of the obvious,
but also its causes, the means by which is it produced around certain words and phrases
and held in place or reiterated. We see this not only in the constraints of synonymy but
also  in  constructions  such  as  the  appositive  relative  clause  in  which,  especially  in
political, social and economic discourse, the effects of the command are more visible and
hence more exposed to contamination by irony: “the United States, the most peace-loving
nation  on  earth,  sent  more  troops  to  Iraq  yesterday”  or  “X,  a  well-known terrorist
organization, has been operating with impunity and must be taken out”. For Pêcheux, the
obvious is a consequence of what may be his own “central thesis” concerning the primacy
of  forgetting.  Words  and  phrases are  “always  already”  endowed  with  a  meaning  or
correlated with a thing, just as the individual is “always already” a subject separate from
other subjects and uniquely responsible for his own free choices:  in the realm of the
“always already”, causal processes are obscured by the effect of obviousness that they
themselves produce. Pêcheux proposes a visible image of this theoretical fantasy: Escher’s
“Drawing  Hands”,  in  which  two  disembodied  hands  are  captured  in  the  process  of
drawing each other into existence. 
32 Forgetting in this sense, however, must be understood as entirely non-subjective and thus
as inherent in discourse itself. It “does not mean the loss of something once known, as
when one speaks of a loss of memory, but the occlusion of the cause of the subject inside
its very effect”32. Forgetting in this sense is not a loss at all, certainly not a negation of
memory;  it  is  instead a movement,  perhaps a pulsation,  entirely within discourse,  of
synonymy and substitution, of what can and cannot be said and thought, including and
above all about oneself as a thinking thing. It is thus in the command, the decree that the
individual as subject (and the history of the meaning of the term “subject” itself, the
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reversal  of  its  meaning,  the shift  from denoting one who is  subjected to the will  of
another to one who is the agent and author of an action, is surely relevant here) emerges
as one whose autonomy and freedom are the effects of the decree that they will freely
decree  their  speech  and  action  for  which  they  are  causally  and  morally/legally
responsible. It is in this movement, as Spinoza had already noted, that both discursive
memory and discursive forgetting, and thus discursive materiality, exist. Such processes
are  neither  functions  of  a  formal  system or  systems,  nor  are  they  grounded in  the
psychology of a subject who “uses” language, well or badly. To understand the work of
forgetting, Pêcheux refers directly to Spinoza (among others) and the argument takes up
where the scholium to EIII, P2 leaves off. 
All the philosophies of consciousness and of the subject (which is to say nearly all of
philosophy,  with  the  exception  of  certain  dissidents  such  as  Spinoza,  Marx,
Nietzsche and Freud) have here their ideological function, which is to repress in the
subject the unrealizable realization of the command33.
33 The subject becomes or is interpellated as a subject in response to a command to forget
the command the subject nevertheless obeys.  The command or decree does not exist
prior to its effects nor can it exist without them: that which is present in discourse in the
form of a forgetting of what has never been present to it because it could not be the
discourse it is, except insofar as it incarnates this forgetting and, at the same time, the
words, phrases and paraphrases that we cannot choose but utter, as if we were repeating
the words of a liturgy or catechism once taught to us and long forgotten as such, now
imposed upon us as the obvious. It is here, as Pêcheux suggests, following Althusser, that
ideology and the unconscious meet: in a forgetting deeper than any memory, because
memory is nothing more than the forgetting of forgetting, the rendering absent of the
absence that allows us to be stand-ins for ourselves, the disappearance of every gap into
the density of a discourse without empty spaces, the writing without margins that covers
the page, the uninterrupted murmur of incessant voices. They exist in the captivity of the
speaking  subject  to  the  obviousness  of  what  cannot  be  forgotten  or  what  we  are
determined to forget. If ideology, in the concrete form of a specific ideological formation,
rests on a “primal or originary forgetting”, like Freud’s Urverdrängung, it “frees” the
subject from the memory of the command that determines what he can and must say, a
command whose meaning is  always a  plurality  of  meanings conjuncturally  united to
produce an effect that, because it originates in no one, applies to everyone. The forgetting
of the command/decree produces the subjected individual whose subjection takes the
form of the imputation of subjectivity: he is subjected to the condition of being a subject
or more precisely, the subject of imputation who comes to recognize that his guilt derives
from his original freedom to have thought, said and done otherwise. 
34  In the preceding discussion, the names of Spinoza, Althusser and Pêcheux have ceased to
refer to particular individuals or distinct bodies of work, and instead merely indicate
dispersion points in a connected theoretical space that could not exist if even one of these
points were not contained in it. Each of the three attempted to restore to the account of
subjection  as  a  corporeal  process  the  materiality  of  discourse,  of  the  decree,  the
command, not as a representation of the real, but as part of it, necessary to its power and
to the effects it produces. But with these attempts came the fear that the very exactitude
of the account was but one more gear in a machine of subjection that could not fail to
reproduce itself. Each stumbled at this point, as if in one and the same gesture, perhaps
afraid that they too were dreaming with their eyes open, to cite the closing phrase of the
scholium to  EIII,  P2  that  Althusser  repeatedly  invoked.  Their  last  works,  unfinished
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manuscripts  in  the  case  of  Spinoza  and  Althusser,  the  Tractatus  Politicus and  The
Underground Current  of  the  Materialism of  the  Encounter,  were marked,  above all,  by an
appropriation of Machiavelli’s concept of fortuna (itself profoundly marked by Lucretius)
in order to resist  the philosophies of  order and system that served to guarantee the
persistence of  subjection.  It  was left  to Michel  Pêcheux in his  final  text,  “Discourse :
Structure or Event ?”, written a few months before his death, to turn to the flow of words
and phrases, to the homophony, the sense that escapes from nonsense, the equivocity
that divides every meaning from itself, the event that in an instant allows the unutterable
to be said and prescribed utterances to be forgotten. He did so not to abandon himself to
a chaos that would simply be the inverse of an infallible order, but to chart the finite
unities and provisional forms to which the practical existence of discourse gives rise, and
the impasses and openings it produces for both thought and action. He cleared a path
through this wilderness and, although it closed up behind him, he left the traces we have
sought to follow.
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ABSTRACTS
This essay examines the place of the concept of discourse in the genesis of Althusser’s theory of
the Ideological State Apparatuses. A reading of his “Three Notes on the Theory of the Discourses”
suggests that the near disappearance of the term “discourse” from the ISAs essay represents the
suppression  rather  than  the  resolution  of  the  contradictions  that  mark  the  notion  of  the
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interpellation of the subject. By reading Althusser in the light of Spinoza’s theory of the decree in
the Ethics and of Pêcheux’s notion of discourse, we are able to grasp the materiality of language
in all its senses, but also to reformulate the lexicon of consciousness and interiority in materialist
terms. The conjunction of Spinoza, Althusser and Pêcheux allows us better to understand and
transform through struggle what the latter called “the plague of subjection”.
Cet  essai  étudie  la  place  du  concept  de  discours  dans  la  genèse  de  la  théorie  des  appareils
idéologiques d’Etat d’Althusser.  Une lecture de ses « Trois notes sur la théorie des discours »
suggère que la  disparition presque totale  du terme « discours »  dans l’essai  sur les  appareils
idéologiques d’Etat représente plus la suppression que la solution des contradictions qui frappent
la notion de l’interpellation du sujet. En lisant Althusser à la lumière de la théorie spinoziste du
décret et de la notion de discours formulée par Pêcheux, nous pouvons saisir la matérialité du
langage dans tous ses sens, mais aussi reformuler le lexique de la conscience et de l’intériorité en
termes matérialistes.  La conjonction de Spinoza, Althusser et Pêcheux nous permet de mieux
comprendre  et  de  transformer  à  travers  la  lutte  ce  que  ce  dernier  appelait  « la  plaie  de  la
subjection ».
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